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  Abstract1 
Social capital has been used to describe the links between 
guildsmen in pre-industrial times. However, contemporary historical 
research has shown that both English society and the guilds displayed 
more openness to newcomers than had been previously thought. This new 
perspective however does not preclude the use of social ties by individuals 
to gain a competitive advantage, as potential apprentices to find a master, 
or as Freemen to climb the ladder of power within the guilds.  
This dissertation will enquire into what type of social capital was 
used and by whom predominantly in the Goldsmiths’ Company. It rests on 
the creation of a new data set of fifty-seven masters who practiced their 
trade in the second half of the seventeenth century. Social capital will be 
analyzed according to geographical proximity, occupational proximity and 
kinship as they manifested in social networks. Results indicate that on the 
one hand, the Goldsmiths’ Company was on the whole open to individuals 
with no previous contacts through geographical proximity, occupational 
proximity or kin. The openness must however be nuanced with respect to 
the rural and poor apprentices as well as women. On the other hand, 
internal mobility within the guild highly depended on the belonging to a 
sub-group of goldsmiths who were practising banking activities. These 
findings confirm the recent literature on openness but bring new light to 
the processes of mobility and social capital within the guild of the London 
Goldsmiths’ Company. 
 
 
Introduction 
 The guilds have long been portrayed as closely-knit groups, typical 
of pre-industrial communities (Gemeinschaft in the vocabulary of 
Tönnies), supported by kinship ties, neighbourhood and parish proximity, 
that is networks with strong bonds. Such an image of the guild did fit into 
the framework of rigid and stratified societies with little mobility and 
                                                 
1 I acknowledge the much appreciated comments and advice of Dr. Oliver Volckart, Dr. 
Patrick Wallis, Prof. Larry Neal and Joseph Burke as well as the availability of David 
Mitchell, the Goldsmiths’ Company Library and London Metropolitan Archives staff. Of 
course, any errors are my own. 
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implied a relative closure of the guilds to newcomers. Additionally, 
internally, guilds have been portrayed as being extremely hierarchical 
leaving few opportunities for small masters to participate in the direction 
of the guild. According to this view, becoming a guildsman was a highly 
regulated and exclusionary process. 
 More recent historical research has nonetheless cast doubt or 
nuanced such a representation of the early modern guilds and society. 
Migration was an essential feature of the growth of cities like London and 
furnished the ranks of the London apprentices. Mercantile occupations 
were taken up by sons of husbandmen as well as sons of the gentry. 
Endogamy has been shown to be relatively low at an aggregate level. 
However, such a representation of the past does not preclude the 
existence of social capital, on the contrary, but it may be understood 
differently. Guildsmen socialized with their customers, their fellow 
workers, their apprentices, their kin and such social ties could serve them 
to increase their mobility by comparison to other groups. Social capital is 
indeed a theory about the “competitive advantage” of the network, “a 
function of social structure [that produces] advantage” 2. Careful 
investment in social ties could considerably help a craftsman to set up his 
shop, for instance with the dowry of his wife or by entering the business of 
his former master. Becoming a guildsman could be open to many, but 
social ties would considerably ease the process. 
 Besides, although mobility and flexibility have been used in the 
literature to characterize the guilds, these institutions were structured 
organizations where not all members had the same level of influence. 
Many members would belong to a Yeomanry, some would enter the 
Livery. However, only a few participated to the Court of Assistant, the 
ruling body, or reached the official position of Warden or Prime Warden. 
                                                 
2Ronald S. Burt, "The Network Structure of Social Capital," Research in Organizational 
Behaviour 22 (2000). p. 348. 
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The ruling elites of the guilds have been deemed to be more connected to 
the world of politics. A few studies have suggested that the guilds were 
the centre of alliances, networks and family ties that served strategic 
purposes.  
 Although the latter emphasis on mobility and flexibility is a much 
more dynamic image of the guild than previously presented, it suggests 
that social capital, understood as the benefits that accrue to an individual 
by participating to a group, could remain significant in early modern 
society, as it is today. Recent reappraisal of the guilds in the early modern 
era forces us, however, to rethink how guilds were networks where social 
capital was created and used, who invested most in social capital and for 
what purposes.  
 To answer the question of where social capital was located in the 
London Goldsmiths’ Company, I collected a new data set on its members 
in the second half of the seventeenth century. In comparison with the 
continent, English guilds have been deemed as more open for 
apprenticeship and mastership. Besides, the Goldsmiths’ Company was 
of modest size in comparison with other guilds such as the Grocers or 
Clothworkers and that could potentially favour proximity of its members. 
On the other hand, the Goldsmiths’ Company experienced profound 
transformations in the second half of the seventeenth century with the 
development of new types of banking activities. Various activities within 
the guild could render investment in social ties more advantageous to 
certain individuals. Retailing required customer skills; banking and credit 
rested on monitoring but also trust. Production demanded technical skills 
but a wide-range of contracts and customers were necessary to be 
assured of constant revenue. I limited this study to two groups in the 
Goldsmiths’ Company at the end of the seventeenth century: a group of 
goldsmith bankers, whose role in the premises of banking have been 
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discussed at length in the literature, and a group of craftsmen and 
retailers who did not engage primarily in financial services.  
 Social capital could be created and accumulated in several ways 
and used to enter or progress within the guild. Geographical proximity 
favoured social contacts and ties in the parish, Church, coffee-houses 
amongst others and could serve for instance to place sons into 
apprenticeship. The socio-economic background and occupation of the 
parents was also a source of social capital. Sons of masters were well-
informed of the apprenticeship system but also on the strategic networks 
that spanned through the guilds. They may intuitively be considered to 
have dominated the population of the guilds. Kinship was another source 
of social capital to secure benefits, but its place with respect to the guilds 
is uncertain as a complementary or competitive network to that of the 
guild. 
 In the rest of the dissertation, I will first review the literature on 
social capital in the guilds and discuss the specificity of the London 
Goldsmiths’ Company. Then I will examine the new data set of fifty seven 
English goldsmiths in the second half of the seventeenth century and 
discuss to what extent social capital was a resource of the Company’s 
members. 
 
 
I.  The Guilds and the Literature on Social Capital 
a) Definition of Social Capital  
 Social capital has remained a fuzzy concept, subject to multiple 
interpretations and sharp criticisms3. It has been variously understood in 
                                                 
3For an overview Joel Sobel, "Can We Trust Social Capital?," Journal of Economic 
Literature 40, no. 1 (2002). For criticisms on the term, Kenneth J. Arrow, "Observations 
on Social Capital," in Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective, ed. Partha Dasgupta 
and Ismail Serageldin (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999). Robert M. Solow, 
"Notes on Social Capital and Economic Performance," in Social Capital: A Multifaceted 
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the literature on the guilds. One of the first and most precise definitions of 
social capital may be that of the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who defined 
social capital as "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which 
are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition"4. 
The concept thus referred to the benefits that accrue to an individual 
when the latter participates to groups or is involved in developing social 
ties. This instrumental understanding of social capital embraces a 
methodological individualism. The concept was further developed 
Loury
by 
aking 
 
en 
pital.  
                                                                                                                                              
5 who emphasized how a lack of connections (social capital) 
restricts the opportunities of minorities. Coleman characterized social 
capital as “a variety of entities with two elements in common: They all 
consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain 
actions of actors - whether persons or corporate actors - within the 
structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, m
possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be
possible"6. Granovetter has given a striking example of how networks 
affect labour mobility and the “heavy dependence of individuals on their 
existing set of personal contacts for information about job-change 
opportunities.”7 Mobility and social stratification have therefore often be
seen as the possession or lack of social ca
 
Perspective, ed. Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin (Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank, 1999). 
4 Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," in Handbook of Theory and Research for the 
Sociology of Education, ed. John G. Richardson (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1986). p. 
248. 
5 Glenn C. Loury, "A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences," in Women, 
Minorities and Employment Discrimination, ed. Annette M. Lamond and Phyllis Ann 
Wallace (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books / D. C. Heath, 1977).  
6 James S. Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," The American 
Journal of Sociology Structure 94 (1988). p. S98. 
7 Mark S. Granovetter, Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1974). p.4. and also Mark S.  Granovetter, "The 
Strength of Weak Ties," American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 (1973). 
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 Social capital at the level of the group, a “conceptual twist”8, was 
introduced in its most influential way by Putnam9, who defined social 
capital as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and 
trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.”10 
Putnam’s work has been formalized by institutional economics and this 
form is dominant in the recent literature on the guilds. The guild is seen 
as an institution11 which, by changing the benefits and costs of 
cooperation or defection, affected economic outcomes and therefore 
allowed the reaching of higher levels of welfare inside the group12. The 
work of institutional economists and traditional researchers of social 
capital use closely interrelated ideas but with different foci. Institutional 
economics focuses on institutions, perceived to be a source of trust and 
thus of greater social interactions. Meanwhile, traditional researchers of 
social capital have grounded their analysis on networks, the structure of 
social ties and how these provide benefits for the individuals involved in 
them. 
                                                 
8Alejandro Portes, "Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology," 
Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998). p. 18. 
9 Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, Making Democracy Work : 
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1993). p. 
167. 
10 Robert D. Putnam, "The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life," The 
American Prospect 4, no. 13 (1993). 
11 Defined as : ‘the humanly devised constraints that understood shape social 
interaction’, reducing ‘uncertainty by providing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) 
structure to human interaction’, Douglass Cecil North, Institutions, Institutional Change, 
and Economic Performance, Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). pp. 3-4. 
12Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from 
Medieval Trade, Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). On the similarities and differences between 
the social capital approach and New Institutional Economics, Philip Keefer and 
Stephen Knack, "Social Capital, Social Norms and the New Institutional Economics," in 
Handbook of New Institutional Economics, ed. Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley 
(Springer, 2005). On the effect of social capital on economic performance, Philip 
Keefer and Stephen Knack, "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-
Country Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 4 (1997). On the 
danger of equating institutions or social capital with economic performance, Sheilagh 
Ogilvie, "'Whatever Is, Is Right'? Economic Institutions in Pre-Industrial Europe," 
Economic History Review 60, no. 4 (2007). 
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b) The Guild as an Institution Fostering Social Capital 
The analysis of social capital, understood as access to resources 
through a network, is most prominent in studies on mobility. Guilds 
regulations had an exclusionary character that could have restricted 
mobility, favoured sons of masters or wealthy individuals. With respect to 
apprenticeship, the Statute of Artificers (1562) allowed only the “children 
of masters and the holders of certain property qualifications”13 to take an 
apprenticeship. The Goldsmiths’ Company also required that apprentices 
be able to read and write. In addition to these regulations, apprenticeship 
was costly and therefore excluded groups with limited resources. Costs 
included payment to the Company (twenty shillings at the Goldsmiths’ 
Company14) but the most expensive fee was paid to the master, between 
£20 and £50 in the second half of the century15 for a working goldsmith. 
However, the literature suggests that they varied with wealth and family 
connections16. Enquiry into the master’s reputation17 also implied higher 
costs for outsiders. Sons of guildsmen seem to be at an advantage to 
enter apprenticeship and this is what some have suggested: “the guilds 
system was a gerontocracy and patrimony and family preference gave all 
Companies and trades an hereditary character.”18 
Regulations on the entry into a Company were also exclusionary. 
Freedom from a Company conveyed citizenship of London, gave the right 
to produce and trade in London, to take apprentices and to participate in 
                                                 
13 K.D.M. Snell, "The Apprenticeship System in British History: The Fragmentation of a 
Cultural Institution," History of Education 25, no. 4 (1996). p. 304. 
14 T. F. Reddaway, "The London Goldsmiths Circa 1500," Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society (Fifth Series) 12 (1962). p. 58. 
15 Peter Earle, The Making of the English Middle Class: Business, Society and Family 
Life in London, 1660-1730 (London: Methuen London, 1989). p. 94.  
16Richard Grassby, The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). p. 66. 
17 Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos, "Service and the Coming of Age of Young Men in 
Seventeenth-Century England," Continuity and Change 3, no. 1 (1988). 
18 Grassby, The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England. p.65. Although 
Grassby has a nuanced judgement on mobility in the seventeenth century England, pp. 
384-94. 
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civic life. Such access was, however, carefully regulated through the 
quotas of apprentices, redemption fees and patrimony requirements. 
Those who entered through redemption had to pay a fee of £20 to the 
City of London19 and an additional fee to the Company. Celebration of the 
newcomer, with a feast paid by the him, was also commonplace20 but 
quite costly. Besides, production was limited to Freemen, who were the 
only ones allowed to bring plate to the Assay until 1700. Foreigners and 
women faced additional restrictions. The former had to provide letters of 
testimonials21 which could be quite strenuous to obtain. They were not 
welcome by masters who signed petitions against their competition22. In 
England, women were not forbidden to enter the guilds, but faced 
restrictions as ‘feme coverts’. ‘Feme soles’ were restricted in their elective 
rights of guild officials.23 As such, it appears that the legislation and the 
practices to admit new members favoured individuals with connections 
inside the guilds. 
Financial costs for setting up a shop24 or paying quarterage fees 
(eight pence at the Goldsmiths’ Company) were often covered by raising 
capital through the family, kin, friends and other networks.  Becoming a 
Freeman of the Goldsmiths’ Company therefore seems to have involved 
high levels of social capital to overcome all these restrictions. Sanctions 
for not abiding by the City and Company’s rules could also be dependent 
                                                 
19 Ibid. p. 65. 
20 Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos, "Failure to Become a Freeman: Urban Apprentices in 
Early Modern England," Social History 16, no. 2 (1991). p. 161. 
21 Lien Bich Luu, Immigrants and the Industries of London, 1500-1700 (Aldershot; 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005). Chapter 7. 
22 John Forbes, "Search, Immigration and the Goldsmiths' Company: A Study in the 
Decline of Its Powers," in Guilds, Society and Economy in London 1450-1850, ed. Ian 
Anders Gadd and Patrick Wallis (Centre for Metropolitan History, 2002). 
23 Richard Grassby, Kinship and Capitalism: Marriage, Family, and Business in the 
English Speaking World, 1580-1720 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
Chapter 8. 
24Earle, The Making of the English Middle Class: Business, Society and Family Life in 
London, 1660-1730. p. 107. 
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on one’s position in the guild and therefore potentially on the level of 
influence and social capital of a master25. 
Overall, the guild regulations and costs associated with 
membership, trade and production may very well have favoured 
individuals with large networks and those who were already connected to 
the Goldsmiths’ Company, namely the masters’ sons.  
Within the guilds, social capital could also be used for personal 
benefit. Indeed, guilds were far from being monolithic institutions. 
Traditionally, the guild has been seen as a hierarchical structure, 
increasingly oligarchic in the seventeenth century26. For Reddaway, the 
Goldsmiths’ Company was “a benevolent autocracy.”27 Many Companies 
were divided between the Yeomanry, deemed to have been composed of 
smaller masters and the Livery28, representing high-status Freemen. In 
the Goldsmiths’ Company29, liverymen could then nominate two choosers 
who would, with the ex-Wardens and Aldermen, decide on the 
Company’s officials, that is, the Wardens. These two choosers were 
required to have served already an office in the Company as Assistants, 
an intermediary court between the Livery and the Wardens. According to 
                                                 
25 Even though this is one hypothesis among others only Patrick Wallis, "Controlling 
Commodities: Search and Reconciliation in the Early Modern Livery Companies," in 
Guilds, Society and Economy in London 1450-1850, ed. Ian Anders Gadd and Patrick 
Wallis (Centre for Metropolitan History: 2002). 
26 G. Unwin, The Guilds and Companies of London (1908) and James R. Farr, Artisans 
in Europe, 1300-1914, New Approaches to European History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). p. 160. 
27 T. F. Reddaway and Lorna E. M. Walker, The Early History of the Goldsmiths' 
Company, 1327-1509 (London: Arnold, 1975). p. 53. 
28 The Yeomanry may not have systematically existed in all guilds. For an account of 
their evolution, Unwin, G., The Guilds and Companies of London, (1908). pp. 58-61. 
For an account of the links with the Livery and the Court of Assistant in the Merchant 
Taylors’ Company of London, Nigel Sleigh-Johnson, "The Merchant Taylors’ Company 
of London under Elizabeth I: Tailors’ Guild or Company of Merchants ?," Costume 41 
(2007).  
29 Ian W. Archer, The Pursuit of Stability: Social Relations in Elizabethan London, 
Cambridge Studies in Early Modern British History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991). p. 103. 
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Reddaway, elected positions after the entrance into the Livery “are lost in 
the limbo to which personalities, influence and prejudices used to go”30. 
Opportunities within the guilds have also been recorded as highly 
and increasingly unequal in the seventeenth century. The capacity of 
smaller masters to influence and be heard by the governing bodies of the 
guild is deemed to have been weakened31. The Livery has also been 
depicted as dominated by the mercantile interest, by opposition to the 
working craftsmen. Tensions opposing different groups have been 
noticed in the literature and broken the monolithic aspect of the guilds32. 
Promotion within the guilds, to the Livery and to the Councils, 
therefore may have required more social capital than mere entrance into 
the guild33. Endogamy at the top of the guilds has been the focus of a few 
studies, including Cerutti’s on the Tailors of Turin34. Kaplan has also 
suggested that family ties were stronger between the eldest and most 
powerful members of the Parisian guilds in the eighteenth century and 
“provided long-term continuity of dominion.”35 The top of the guilds were 
also more involved in politics and access to such powerful positions was 
restricted for artisans36. 
                                                 
30 Reddaway, "The London Goldsmiths Circa 1500." p. 54. 
31 Farr, Artisans in Europe, 1300-1914. pp.161-4, G. Unwin, The Guilds and 
Companies of London (1908). pp. 217-42. 
32 Steven L. Kaplan, "The Character and Implications of Strife among Masters inside 
the Guilds of Eighteenth-Century Paris," Journal of Social History 19, no. 4 (1986), 
Carlo Poni, "Norms and Disputes: The Shoemakers' Guild in Eighteenth-Century 
Bologna," Past and Present 123, no. 1 (1989).  
33Farr, Artisans in Europe, 1300-1914. pp. 35-6. 
34 Simona Cerutti, "Group Strategies and Trade Strategies: The Turin Tailors Guild in 
the Late Seventeenth Century and Early Eighteenth Centuries," in Domestic Strategies: 
Work and Family in France and Italy, 1600-1800, ed. Stuart Woolf (Cambridge: 1991). 
35 Kaplan, "The Character and Implications of Strife among Masters inside the Guilds of 
Eighteenth-Century Paris." p. 633. 
36 Unwin, The Guilds and Companies of London. p.113. Farr, Artisans in Europe, 1300-
1914.p.188. 
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 Horizontal connections with other members of the guild could occur 
through family networks37. The kin was a source of physical, human and 
social capital38 that could help corner markets and develop niches. It 
could provide the credit and supervision necessary for hazardous projects 
or investments and help cover costs for setting up a business39. The kin 
was also a great source of information and a source of reputation40.  
 The networks that spanned throughout the guilds required places 
and times for socialization. The guild rhetoric suggests that guilds aimed 
at forging a strong identity (which undoubtedly would also lower 
monitoring costs). In the Goldsmiths’ Company brotherliness was a duty 
formally expressed in the mandatory attendance to each brother’s funeral 
(in the sixteenth century). Ceremonies, rituals and social events equally 
contributed to reinforce ties between guildsmen41 and to develop this 
guild identity. Annual celebrations included the patron saint’s Feast Day, 
St Dunstan in the case of the Goldsmiths’ Company, pageants, 
processions, parades or the London Mayor’s show in the seventeenth 
century42. Resources devoted to the poor relief in the Goldsmiths’ 
                                                 
37 Sheilagh Ogilvie, "The Use and Abuse of Trust: Social Capital and Its Deployment by 
Early Modern Guilds " CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1302  (2004). p. 6. 
38 Grassby, Kinship and Capitalism : Marriage, Family, and Business in the English 
Speaking World, 1580-1720. 
39 Joan Lane, Apprenticeship in England, 1600-1914 (London: UCL Press, 1996). pp. 
229-239. 
40 For an example of such claims in the Goldsmiths’ Company, Philippa Glanville, 
"Introduction," in Goldsmiths, Silversmiths and Bankers : Innovation and the Transfer of 
Skill, 1550 to 1750 : A Collection of Working Papers Given at a Study Day Held Jointly 
by the Centre for Metropolitan History and the Victoria and Albert Museum, 24 
November 1993, ed. David  Mitchell (Stroud: Sutton & Centre for Metropolitan History, 
1995). p. 3 
41 Unwin, The Guilds and Companies of London. Chapters 12 and 16. Farr, Artisans in 
Europe, 1300-1914. Chapter 7.  
42 For a description, William Chaffers, Gilda Aurifabrorum : A History of English 
Goldsmiths and Plateworkers, and Their Marks Stamped on Plate, Copied in Facsimile 
from Celebrated Examples; and the Earliest Records Preserved at Goldsmith's Hall, 
London, with Their Names, Addresses, and Dates of Entry, 2500 Illustrations, Also 
Historical Accounts of the Goldsmiths' Company and Their Hall Marks; Their Regalia; 
the Mint; Closing of the Exchequer; Goldsmith-Bankers; Shop Signs; a Copious Index, 
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Company were high in comparison with other guilds such as the Grocers 
or the Clothworkers43. Confraternities had additional socializing purposes 
through charity works and mutual aid. The confraternities, replaced by 
“clubs”, were an additional way of forming social capital, without the 
tensions and competition that could arise from the craft44.  
 
c) Limits to Guilds’ Capacity to Foster Social Capital 
 The capacity of social capital creation by the guild has however 
been nuanced in the recent literature. Although the powers of the guilds 
were theoretically extremely high, including that of outlawry from 
London45, the rise of suburbs of London, the existence of the Liberties 
and a few Parliamentary Acts gradually weakened the guilds’ regulatory 
powers46 and therefore their exclusionary powers as well. The dilution of 
the identity between the calling and the trade practised, the blurring of the 
distinctions between citizens and non-citizens, the participation of the 
Liveries to underground practices in the suburbs47 and an increasing 
social differentiation48 within the guilds participated to the decline of 
Companies’ individual identities. Migration was another possibility for 
those who did not complete the apprenticeship49, an option that 
eventually would undermine corporate identity. Drop-out rates in the 
                                                                                                                                               
&C. &C., Preceded by an Introductory Essay on the Goldsmiths' Art, New ed. (London: 
Reeves and Turner, 1899). pp .9-13. 
43 Archer, The Pursuit of Stability : Social Relations in Elizabethan London. p. 123. 
44 Farr, Artisans in Europe, 1300-1914. p. 229. 
45 Reddaway, "The London Goldsmiths Circa 1500." 
46 J.R. Kellett, "The Breakdown of Gild and Corporation Control over the Handicraft and 
Retail Trade in London," Economic History Review 10, no. 3 (1958). p. 384. 
47 Joseph P. Ward, Metropolitan Communities: Trade Guilds, Identity, and Change in 
Early Modern London (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997). pp. 42, 71.  
48 Archer, The Pursuit of Stability: Social Relations in Elizabethan London. P.188. Farr, 
Artisans in Europe, 1300-1914. 
49 On alternative opportunities for apprentices who migrated, Ben-Amos, "Failure to 
Become a Freeman: Urban Apprentices in Early Modern England." 
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Goldsmiths’ Company (forty five percent) are in line with the other London 
guilds50.  
 Besides, recent reappraisals of the geographical and socio-
economic origins of apprentices suggest that these were quite diverse. 
The share of the gentry increased through the century and penetrated 
mercantile activities. The husbandry and yeomanry’s mobility were not as 
remarkable, in part due to a rise of the entrance fees51. From a 
geographical perspective, in 1690, seventy percent of the apprentices of 
London were still from outside the City52. Furthermore, according to Ben-
Amos, entry into Freedom was not influenced by the apprentice’s social 
origin53. She equally downplays the capacity to create social capital 
through apprenticeship because of the competitive pressures that rested 
on the masters’ shoulders.54 The position of women in the guilds was also 
“eroded” between the sixteenth and the eighteenth century55. 
 The hierarchical nature of the guilds has been to a certain extent 
nuanced. Even if artisans did not participate in the decision-making of 
their Company, the Court of Assistant was sometimes a place where 
artisans could express their concerns56, especially if the ruling body was 
divided between powerful masters with conflicting interests57. Artisans 
may have possessed their own circles of influence in the middle tiers of 
the companies58. 
                                                 
50 Grassby, The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England. p. 139. 
51 Christopher Brooks, "Apprenticeship, Social Mobility and the Middling Sort, 1550-
1800," in The Middling Sort of People: Culture, Society, and Politics in England, 1550-
1800, ed. Jonathan Barry and Christopher Brooks (Basingstoke: 1994). 
52 Grassby, The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England. p. 155. 
53 Ben-Amos, "Failure to Become a Freeman: Urban Apprentices in Early Modern 
England." p.160. 
54 Ibid. p.164 Grassby agrees and suggests that Masters preferred apprentices to 
remain journeymen. 
55 Farr, Artisans in Europe, 1300-1914. p. 40. 
56 Archer, The Pursuit of Stability: Social Relations in Elizabethan London. p. 106. 
57 Ward, Metropolitan Communities: Trade Guilds, Identity, and Change in Early 
Modern London. pp. 74-5. 
58 Archer, The Pursuit of Stability: Social Relations in Elizabethan London. p. 107. 
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 The systematic character of family relationships within the guilds 
has also been questioned albeit in non-English contexts. E. J. 
Shephard’s59 study of Dijon suggests that only a minority of apprentices 
were sons of masters. Claire Dolan60 claims that in Aix-en-Provence, 
family ties were not strong in all guilds. Higher capital requirements in the 
weaver’s guild (where the possession of a loom was crucial) could have 
triggered people to invest more in social capital in the form of kinship ties. 
Farr in his analysis of the Dijon artisanry61 has also noticed that seventy-
five to eighty percent of the marriages were contracted with individuals 
unrelated to the guilds. Cerutti’s analysis62 confirms the strategic aspect 
of marriage, as a way for the guild elite to form alliances with trades and 
occupations complementary to the Turin Taylor’s, such as Turin’s 
merchants.  
 
 
II Case study: The Goldsmiths’ Company in the Seventeenth 
Century  
a) The Goldsmiths’ Company During the Second Half of the 
Seventeenth Century 
 The Company had a specific relationship with the Crown. When 
chartered in 1327, it received privileges and was requested by the King to 
perform specific functions such as supervision of the currency, especially 
                                                 
59 Edward J. Shephard, "Social and Geographic Mobility of the Eighteenth-Century 
Guild Artisan: An Analysis of Guild Receptions in Dijon, 1700–1790," in Work in 
France. Representations Meaning, Organization, and Practice, ed. Steven L. Kaplan 
and Cynthia J. Koepp (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986). 
60 Claire Dolan, "The Artisans of Aix-En-Provence in the Sixteenth Century: A Micro-
Analysis of Social Relationships," in Cities and Social Change in Early Modern France, 
ed. Philip Benedict (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 
61 James R. Farr, "Consumers, Commerce, and the Craftsmen of Dijon: The Changing 
Social and Economic Structure of a Provincial Capital, 1450-1750," in Cities and Social 
Change in Early Modern France, ed. Philip Benedict (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 
62 Cerutti, "Group Strategies and Trade Strategies: The Turin Tailors Guild in the Late 
Seventeenth Century and Early Eighteenth Centuries." 
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foreign currency from the distant trade. It was granted jurisdiction over 
London in 1478 and over the country in 1509. The national character of 
the guild could have implied higher connections between the London 
guildsmen and their counterparts in the rest of the country.  
 Before the seventeenth century, the goldsmiths provided the 
Church with precious religious items. Goldsmiths also supplied sound 
investment to their customers through the sale of plates, silverwares and 
other items in precious metals but also sold jewellery. On the 
manufacturing side, goldsmiths refined gold and silver. Most financial 
services were before the second half of the century circumscribed to 
pawning and foreign exchange63. 
 Several short-term events must have been particularly disruptive on 
the Company networks. The draft of men into the armies of Charles I, the 
plague in 1665 and then the Great Fire in 1666 had deadly consequences 
on the Company’s members. Besides, the latter deprived the Company 
from using its hall, one of the centres of socialization of the masters and 
destroyed much of its property owned throughout London. 
 As in other London industries, the Goldsmiths’ Company was also 
affected by long-term trends. Changes of fashion and increased 
consumption required larger stocks for the retailers and therefore higher 
levels of capitalization. It also raised start-up costs. For a goldsmith, Earle 
estimated the entry cost to have been between 500 to 3000 pounds64. 
Such capital requirements could keep competition at bay and reduce 
openness of the guild to more wealthy families or individuals who could 
rely on their networks to obtain credit or capital.  
                                                 
63 David. Mitchell, "Innovation and the Transfer of Skill in the Goldsmith's Trade in 
Restoration London," in Goldsmiths, Silversmiths and Bankers: Innovation and the 
Transfer of Skill, 1550 to 1750: A Collection of Working Papers Given at a Study Day 
Held Jointly by the Centre for Metropolitan History and the Victoria and Albert Museum, 
24 November 1993, ed. David Mitchell (Stroud: Sutton & Centre for Metropolitan 
History, 1995). 
64 Earle, The Making of the English Middle Class: Business, Society and Family Life in 
London, 1660-1730. p. 107. 
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 Specialization65 supported the sub-contracting system which 
modified the traditional structure of the workshop. It operated potentially 
to the detriment of large households and to the development of social 
capital between masters, apprentices, journeymen and sub-contracted 
workers. However, this might not have been very pronounced for the 
goldsmiths, as Kahl66 suggests that levels of apprenticeship remained 
high until 1720 (between 743 and 790 between 1690 and 1719) and fell 
only thereafter. 
 
b) The Development of Banking Activities at the Goldsmiths’ 
Company  
 The goldsmiths experienced a great change in the second half of 
the seventeenth century with the development of banking67. Gradual 
innovation was however necessary to develop this new “technology”68. 
Scriveners were the other main providers of financial intermediaries, 
keeping money deposits for the purpose of loans69. According to 
Richards, the goldsmiths’ banking activities involved70: ‘‘Interest was paid 
on deposits; loans were supplied; bills of exchange, tallies and various 
types of Treasury-Exchequer payment orders were discounted; 
promissory notes, which circulated freely, were issued; cheques were 
used; bullion was bought and sold; foreign coins were changed; 
systematic accounts were kept in special ledgers.’’. One of the main 
differences between the goldsmiths and the Bank of England was that of 
                                                 
65 James R. Farr, "On the Shop Floor: Guilds, Artisans, and the European Market 
Economy, 1350-1750.," Journal of Early Modern History 1, no. 1 (1997). 
66W. F. Kahl, "Apprenticeship and the Freedom of the London Livery Companies, 1690-
1750," Guildhall Miscellany 7 (1956). p. 18. 
67 These transformations were perceived by contemporaries, " 'the New-Fashioned 
Goldsmiths'," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 2, no. 2 (1888). 
68 Peter Temin and Hans-Joachim Voth, "Banking as an Emerging Technology: Hoare’s 
Bank, 1702–1742," Financial History Review 13, no. 2 (2006). 
69 Richard D.  Richards, Early History of Banking in England (London: 1929). 
70 Ibid. pp. 23-4. 
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clearing house function that appeared only in the latter71. Goldsmiths 
operated on a bilateral system solely. The banking services involved high 
risks; large overdrafts could be monitored in an unregulated system72 
only  with great difficultly. Higher levels of social capital could incre
information flows among goldsmith bankers. 
ase 
 However, several crises would hit the goldsmiths and test the 
resilience of their system, namely the Stop of the Exchequer in 1672, the 
creation of the Bank of England in 1694 and eventually the South Sea 
Bubble in 1720 which then marks the end of the public banking activities 
of the goldsmiths73. 
 
 
III Analysis of the Data Collected on London Goldsmiths 
a) Sources and Samples 
 Two samples of goldsmiths were constructed to enquire into the 
questions of openness of the group, intra-guild mobility, and social capital 
through business or family networks. To make sure that the goldsmiths 
practiced the trade of goldsmithing or silversmithing74, a sample was 
drawn from the Court of Orphans Inventories between 1665 and 1729 
(Appendix). Inventories specify, amongst others, whether the master 
owned a shop, a working house, working tools and the type of wares in 
the shop75. Selected goldsmiths either owned a shop exclusively (twenty 
goldsmiths), a workhouse (one goldsmith) or both (four goldsmiths). 
Additionally, masters who could be identified in the Goldsmiths’ Company 
                                                 
71 Stephen Quinn, "Goldsmith-Banking: Mutual Acceptance and Interbanker Clearing in 
Restoration London," Explorations in Economic History 34 (1997). 
72 Quinn compares it to the ‘free-banking’ era in the United States. Ibid. p. 414. 
73 Stephen Quinn, "Money, Finance, and Capital Markets," in Cambridge Economic 
History of Britain since 1700, ed. Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
74 As noticed above there is a decline in the identity between the Freedom from a 
Company and the trade practiced in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. 
75 It thus allows to exclude individuals practising others trades. 
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Records and who were not described as goldsmith bankers in the 
secondary literature were selected76. In total, our sample of craftsmen 
and retailers not involved in banking activities contains twenty-five 
individuals. We call this sample “Craftsmen” as shorthand in the rest of 
the data analysis. Compared to the total population of masters (estimated 
at 290 Freemen between 1690 and 1699)77 our sample is modest. It 
draws individuals over a wide time stretch (see Table 1 with over a third 
of the masters indentured before 1650). This undoubtedly biases the 
sample of the Craftsmen against cohesiveness as they may not have 
been in contact with each other personally. 
 The second sample of thirty-two goldsmiths, here called ‘Bankers’, 
was engaged in banking activities as explained above. They are recorded 
in the 1677 London Directory as “goldsmiths that keep running cashes”78. 
Those additionally confirmed in the secondary literature to be goldsmith 
bankers and who could be matched in the Goldsmiths’ Company records 
form our sample. Twenty-nine goldsmiths were identified following this 
procedure and a further three were added from the Court of Orphans list 
as mentioned above. By comparison, the sample of Bankers is large 
relative to the total population of goldsmith bankers. It must however be 
noted that the real population size must have constantly varied as many 
abandoned banking79or simply went bankrupt80 especially after the Stop 
of the Exchequer in 1672. Grassby counts 93 goldsmith bankers between 
1670 and 1700 but only five remaining in 170081. Hilton-Price82 counts 31 
                                                 
76 Quinn, "Goldsmith-Banking: Mutual Acceptance and Interbanker Clearing in 
Restoration London.", Richards, Early History of Banking in England .  
77 Kahl, "Apprenticeship and the Freedom of the London Livery Companies, 1690-
1750." p. 18. 
78 Thanks to  Pr. Larry Neal for pointing me towards this source. The Little London 
Directory of 1677,  (London: John Camden Hotten, Piccadily., 1878).  
79 Temin and Voth, "Banking as an Emerging Technology: Hoare’s Bank, 1702–1742." 
p. 149. 
80 Bankruptcy was nonetheless more prevalent among the bankers of political 
authorities than among the retailers of the gentry. 
81 Grassby, The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England. p. 253. 
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in 1670, 44 in 1677 and 35 in 1687, 42 in 1700. The sample of Bankers is 
also much more concentrated time-wise due to the sample construction 
procedure (all were practising in 1677, see Table 1), except for three 
Bankers who were added from the Court of Orphans. It can bias the 
sample towards more connections between the individuals if guilds 
displayed strong social capital at each generation. 
 A note of caution should be struck with regards to specialization of 
the banking activities. This division has probably been amplified by the 
diverging trends in the literature, on one side in banking history and on 
the other side in silver studies83. There are numerous examples of so-
called ‘Bankers’ who had retailing activities for plate, jewels, or who were 
even involved in imports of precious stones84. Similarly ‘shop-keeping 
goldsmiths’ (retailers and wholesalers) could be involved in pawns, and 
most businessmen relied on credit85 with each other and their customers. 
They may have invested money in securities and other financial 
instruments provided by the Lotteries or the East India Company for 
private uses86. However, their banking activities were never as consistent 
or as sophisticated as the Bankers referred to by the financial literature. It 
is accordingly possible to differentiate the two groups; one of Bankers, 
and another of Craftsmen and Retailers. 
                                                                                                                                               
82 F. G. Hilton Price, A Handbook of London Bankers; with Some Account of Their 
Predecessors, the Early Goldsmiths: Together with Lists of Bankers from 1670, 
Including the Earliest Printed in 1677, to That of the London Post Office Directory of 
1890 (Many Hitherto Unpublished), Enlarged ed. (London: Leadenhall Press, 1890). 
pp. 182-5. 
83 Mitchell, "Innovation and the Transfer of Skill in the Goldsmith's Trade in Restoration 
London." 
84 David Mitchell, "'Mr. Fowle Pray Pay the Washwoman': The Trade of a London 
Goldsmith-Banker, 1660-1692," Business and Economic History 22, no. 1 (1994). p.28, 
Edgar R. Samuel, "Sir Francis Child’s Jewellery Business," Three Banks Review 13 
(1977). 
85 Earle, The Making of the English Middle Class: Business, Society and Family Life in 
London, 1660-1730. p. 121. 
86 Ibid. p. 154. 
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 In addition to the masters described above, a list of the masters’ 
apprentices was drawn from compiled sources at the Goldsmiths’ 
Company. One problem is that the Company’s list is allegedly not 
comprehensive. Our sample is likely to bias upward the number of 
apprentices: masters who had zero apprentices during their working life 
have been omitted in the same way as masters missing in the Records of 
pairs of masters and apprentices. The two groups were indeed not 
distinguishable and thus omitted from the sample’s statistics.  
The Goldsmiths’ Company Apprenticeship Books record the 
following information: the name, place of origin, name of the father, 
occupation of the father, date of indenture. It concerns 150 apprentices 
for the Bankers and 93 apprentices for the Craftsmen. I transcribed the 
information only from the Apprenticeship Books One to Four. 
 Finally, the Wills from the Court of Canterbury were searched and 
transcribed for seven identified Bankers and twelve identified Craftsmen 
(Appendix). Wills proved at the Court of Canterbury belonged to 
individuals with a certain personal wealth87, which brings a bias towards 
the wealthiest goldsmiths. The Wills are used below to trace family 
relationships and the integrative capacity of the Goldsmiths’ Company. 
Additional secondary sources used were Boyd's Inhabitants of London, 
Boyd's Family Units 1209-194888 and the 1692 Poll Tax database 
originally created by J. Alexander.89 
 
b) Overview of the Characteristics of the Goldsmiths 
 As suggested in the literature, Table 1 shows that only a very small 
fraction of the goldsmiths entered the Company through patrimony or 
                                                 
87 Property left was to be estimated worth at least 5 pounds, and 10 pounds in London, 
for a Will to be proved in the Prerogative Court of Canterbury. 
88 Electronic version by The Society of Genealogists. 
89 Provided by Dr. Patrick Wallis (LSE), for details on the database J. Alexander, "The 
Economic Structure of the City of London at the End of the Seventeenth Century," 
Urban History 16 (1989). 
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redemption. The occupations recorded in the 1692 Poll Tax indicate that 
eleven individuals in our sample were working as goldsmiths, two as 
silversmiths (to be found only in the Craftsmen sample), three had no 
occupation recorded and one was described as “gentleman”. Estimation 
of wealth90 on property (rack rent values) and on working capital and 
goods not related to the household (taxed stocks) suggests that the group 
of Bankers was much more wealthy than the group of Craftsmen, with a 
Rent value more than twice as high and taxed stocks value about four 
times higher than the Craftsmen’s. Unless the Bankers came from 
extremely wealthy families or inherited in a disproportionate way in 
comparison with their Craftsmen counterparts, their activities must also 
have been more lucrative trades.  
 The size of the household was slightly higher in the group of the 
Bankers (by nearly one member) because of the greater number of 
servants or apprentices91 working in their households (by nearly two 
members). None of the households contained kin members in our 
samples. Such results are in line with the literature92. Earle has shown 
that the size of the household depended as well on the age of the head of 
the household and the number of years after marriage93. Due to the 
biases in the sample, it is possible that the average household of the 
Craftsmen was younger than that of the Bankers. It is also possible that 
being wealthier, the Bankers recruited more than the Craftsmen. 
On average, both Craftsmen and Bankers in the above samples 
took their freedom shortly after the date they were supposed to finish 
apprenticeship. If the length of the indentures were respected, goldsmiths 
                                                 
90 Alexander, J. "The Economic Structure of the City of London at the End of the 
Seventeenth 
Century." p. 48. 
91 Distinction between servants and apprentices is not always reliable, Earle, The 
Making of the English Middle Class : Business, Society and Family Life in London, 
1660-1730. p. 213. 
92 Ibid. pp. 212-8. 
93 Ibid. pp. 212-8. 
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entered on average a year and a half after they had terminated their 
indentures, with no major discrepancy between the two groups. This is an 
extremely fast rate in comparison with Ben-Amos’ figures for Bristol at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century94 (with more than forty percent of 
the apprentices taking the Freedom only after two years or more). Wealth, 
networks and social ties could have helped the apprentices of our sample 
to enter the Company relatively quickly.  
  Entrance into higher offices is strikingly different between the two 
groups of goldsmiths, which once again justifies studying their 
characteristics separately. Sixty nine percent of the Bankers entered the 
Livery whereas only forty eight percent of the Craftsmen did the same. 
Entrance into the Livery was costly95 and this may be why Bankers, who 
were wealthier, were over-represented. At the level of Warden or Prime 
Warden the discrepancy is even wider: forty one percent of the Bankers 
entered the office whereas only eight percent of the Craftsmen did as 
well. The group of Bankers is therefore disproportionately represented in 
the highest positions of the Company.  Interestingly, not only were the 
Bankers more numerous in the offices of the Company, they also entered 
them more quickly, thereby suggesting that seniority was not the only 
criteria for holding office.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
94 Ben-Amos, "Failure to Become a Freeman: Urban Apprentices in Early Modern 
England."p.159. 
95 Earle, The Making of the English Middle Class: Business, Society and Family Life in 
London, 1660-1730. p. 253. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of the Bankers and the Craftsmen 
    Bankers Craftsmen 
Sample size 32 25 
indentured 32 24 
Patrimony 1 1 
Masters’ 
characteristics 
Redemption 0 1 
Identified masters 8 9 
goldsmith 6 5 
silversmith 0 2 
gentleman 1 0 
no occupation recorded 1 2 
Mean value Rents in pounds 66.4 28 
Mean value taxed stocks in pounds 462.5 108.3 
Mean household size (includes master, wife, 
children, servants, apprentices and kin recorded) 6.8 6 
1692 Poll Tax 
Mean number of servants and apprentices 4 2.2 
Indenture starting date   
Before 1650 4 9 
1650-1670 26 7 
1670-1690 2 7 
After 1690 0 2 
Masters’ 
apprenticeship 
Average years indentured 7.5 7.7 
Masters’ 
freedom 
Years between start of indenture and freedom 
from the Company 8.7 9.1 
Number 22 (69%) 12 (48%) 
- of those not entered by apprenticeship 0 0 Entrance into the Livery 
Average number of years after taking freedom 6,1 8,1 
Number 13 (41%) 2 (8%) Wardens Average years after freedom 25,8 40 
Participation 
to Civic Life Alderman 6 (19 %) 1 (4%) 
Number of apprentices who are also masters 8 2 
Number of goldsmiths who took at least one 
apprentice 26 (82%) 20 (80%) 
Average number of apprentices for masters who 
took at least one apprentice 5.5 4.7 
Minimum number of apprentices of masters who 
took at least one apprentice 1 2 
Apprentices 
Maximum number of apprentices of masters who 
took at least one apprentice 10 12 
Number 7 12 Wills Bequest to the Company 1 0 
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Bankers who took at least one apprentice recruited slightly more 
than the Craftsmen by nearly one apprentice on average. It is not 
possible to estimate if it was due to a high turnover in the shops of the 
Bankers, if they were wealthier to afford training more apprentices 
(including by requiring higher fees) and hiring more servants, if they 
attracted more apprentices or simply accepted more apprentices. 
However, Bankers transferred their skills to their apprentices: twenty four 
out of thirty-two of the Bankers were trained by other Bankers96 from a 
former generation. We cannot compare these results with that of the 
Craftsmen, as the court of Orphans’ Inventories do not allow us to 
distinguish between various specializations of goldsmiths. 
 The Bankers appear as a distinctive group in the Goldsmiths’ 
Company. They were wealthier, recruited more apprentices in their shops 
and were promoted inside the company at a much faster and greater rate 
than the Craftsmen. Reaching such positions required talent, skill, 
probably wealth, but, as suggested by the literature on social capital, ties 
are invaluable to reach access to resources and positions. We now 
enquire where social capital was located in the Company: who was 
accepted in the Company, who was co-opted into the higher offices? 
What network or types of social capital were mobilized to enter in the 
Company and progress into its hierarchical order? 
 
c) Did the Goldsmiths’ Company Display Strong Social Capital? 
(i) Geographical Origins 
 Proximity can be a source of social capital and geographical 
mobility an indicator of the openness of the Goldsmiths’ Company to 
newcomers. Masters and future apprentices or their fathers could have 
                                                 
96 Only eight Bankers were bound into apprenticeship by Masters from our sample but 
the financial literature reveals that another sixteen Masters are known to been 
financiers of an earlier generation. 
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socialized as neighbours, by going to the same local tavern, coffee-house 
or to the same club. Middling people knew each other well within the 
boundaries of their neighbourhoods97. Geographical proximity also raised 
information about available placements, the master’s character and 
qualities, the apprentice’s character and socio-economic background98. In 
a nutshell, individuals with common geographical origins can easily 
develop stronger ties with each others. 
 Table 2 below confirms the literature on geographical mobility in the 
second half of the seventeenth century. Twenty eight percent of all the 
apprentices came from London (Bankers, Craftsmen, masters and 
apprentices). The four adjacent counties to London accounted for another 
fourteen percentage points. The fourteen counties around London and 
London were the origin of sixty three percent of all apprentices. We can 
notice that there are hardly any differences between the Bankers and the 
Craftsmen, the former attracting only slightly more apprentices from 
London. This result could be due to two combining factors: first, the time 
stretch over which the Craftsmen are indentured is greater than that of 
the Bankers’, and second, the literature suggests that apprentices’ 
geographical origin became less diverse and more centred on London by 
the end of the century. Kahl99 had found that fifty three percent of the 
goldsmiths between 1690 and 1699 were from London which suggests a 
strong decreasing geographical mobility in the very last decades of the 
seventeenth century and in the eighteenth century.  
 
 
 
                                                 
97 Earle, The Making of the English Middle Class: Business, Society and Family Life in 
London, 1660-1730. p. 241. 
98 Ben-Amos, "Service and the Coming of Age of Young Men in Seventeenth-Century 
England." 
99 Kahl, "Apprenticeship and the Freedom of the London Livery Companies, 1690-
1750."  
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Table 2 Geographical Origins of the Goldsmiths 
 Bankers Cumulative percentage Craftsmen 
Cumulative 
percentage 
London 44 29% 25 26% 
London + 4 (1) 63 42% 41 43% 
London + 14 (2) 96 64% 60 63% 
Total 151 100% 95 100% 
  
(1) London, Essex, Kent, Middlesex and Surrey 
(2) London, the four counties above and Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, 
Cambridgeshire, Hertfordshire, Huntingdonshire, Northamptonshire, Oxfordshire, 
Southamptonshire and Suffolk. 
 
 These findings suggest that the Goldsmiths’ Company was open 
geographically to newcomers during our era of study especially in 
comparison with later periods. The recruitment of new members was not 
restricted to the London area100. Therefore, social capital localized in the 
parish, neighbourhood, Church or any institution in London could have 
been used to place apprentices (less than thirty percent of them were 
from London) but it remained modest in comparison with the early 
eighteenth century.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
100 Three apprentices are coming as far as ‘The Kingdom of Ireland’ to be apprenticed 
at the London goldsmiths. 
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Table 3 Chain Migration with Masters and Apprentices 
  
Bankers'  
apprentices 
Craftsmen 
apprentices 
Number of masters who took at least 
one apprentice 26 19 
Number of apprentices in the sample 129 71 
Master – Apprentices networks of migration 
Number of apprentices from the same 
county as the master 31    (24 %) 10 (11%) 
- excluding London 19    (15%) 10 (11%) 
Average number of apprentices by 
master from the same county as their 
master 
1.7 
(18 masters) 
1.3 
(8 masters) 
Apprentice – Apprentice networks of migration 
Number of apprentices from the same 
county indentured at the same master 52   (40%) 28   (40%) 
- excluding London 23   (18%) 10   (14%) 
Average group size of apprentices from 
same county 
2.4 
(19 masters) 
2,3 
(9 masters) 
 
An economic and historical analysis of migration has put forward 
the concept of chain migration101. Networked migrants widely draw on 
their social capital for help and information. Members of the network may 
also provide some forms of financial assistance, find a placement or 
accommodation. It is extremely difficult to know whether the immigrants 
from our sample all had a contact in London. It is however possible to 
trace the number of apprentices who come from the same county as their 
masters. We can also verify whether several apprentices came from the 
same county, the apprentice being the conduit for chain migration.  
Results in Table 3 give information by county and not by village or 
town so they are only an upper bound. The results from such pairing 
suggest only moderate rates of shared origins both between masters and 
apprentices and between apprentices. In the case of masters and 
apprentices networks, we observe that for both groups of Bankers and 
                                                 
101 Dudley  Baines, "European Emigration, 1815-1930: Looking at the Emigration 
Decision Again " The Economic History Review, New Series 47, no. 3 (1994). 
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Craftsmen, less than a quarter of the apprentices came from the same 
county as their masters. When one excludes London, this rate falls even 
lower, below fifteen percent. Given that an analysis at the county level 
largely overestimates shared origins, the number of apprentices and 
masters from the same county was probably much lower. On average, 
masters who shared a geographical origin with their apprentices did so 
with only slightly over one apprentice out of an average of five enrolled 
apprentices. The percentage of apprentices with the same origin as their 
masters is slightly greater for the Bankers. 
 Rates of shared origins among apprentices are slightly higher but it 
is mostly due to the demographic predominance of London. After 
excluding apprentices from London, the rate of shared origin by county 
falls to slightly over fifteen percent. Overall, for seventy percent of the 
Bankers and forty seven percent of the Craftsmen, at least two 
apprentices were from the same county. However, as explained above, 
counting at the county level is only a large upper bound of common 
shared origins. 
 How does the geographical origin influence climbing up the ladder 
of the Goldsmiths’ Company? In the sample of the Craftsmen, none of the 
liverymen were from London. In the group of Bankers, five liverymen out 
of twenty two (22.7 percent) were from London. Overall, when the 
samples of Bankers and Craftsmen are combined the geographical 
repartition in the Livery is somewhat less favourable to those from London 
and the repartition in the rest of the Company. Thus, there is no reason to 
consider that not being from London was an obstacle to entry into the 
Livery. Geographical origin seems to have been neither a barrier to 
entrance in the guild nor to progression in the Livery.  
 With respect to Wardenship, two goldsmiths in the sample of 
Craftsmen became Warden or Prime Warden but they were not from 
London. It should be remembered, however, that this sample is extremely 
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small. In the sample of the Bankers, thirteen goldsmiths became Warden 
or Prime Warden and only three of them were from London (twenty three 
percent). The proportion of Bankers who were Warden or Prime Warden 
and came from London is very close to the geographical repartition within 
the guild. Coming from a county outside London did not harm the 
chances of an apprentice to enter the Goldsmiths’ Company in the middle 
and the second half of the seventeenth century. Neither was it detrimental 
to progress as an official of the guild. Thus the social capital that the 
family had accumulated in the county of origin was not indispensable to 
move upwards in this London guild. The apprentice who had entered the 
Company was likely to rely on other forms of social capital. 
 
(ii) Occupational Networks 
 The occupation or the status’ similarity of an apprentice’s father 
with the master goldsmith must have increased the existing social ties 
between them. Practising the same trade as their parents would provide 
the future apprentices with the greatest available information. Moreover, 
parents of a “to-be apprentice” in related occupations could also use their 
social capital for a placement.  
The occupation of the apprentice’s father reported in the 
Apprenticeship Books is however far from being interpretable in a 
straightforward manner. Besides, it is often simply replaced by an 
indication of status. High status such as “esquire” initially described “sons 
of barons, knights, royal creations and their heirs but (…) was adopted by 
the doctors of law and divinity, officials, judges, sheriffs and JPs.”102  The 
gentry did not always map onto the land-owning society. According to 
Brooks up to twenty percent of the ‘gent’ recruits were sons of 
                                                 
102 Grassby, The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England. p. 142. For a 
discussion of the categories pp.141-4. 
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professional men and “well-to-do townsmen”103. Status classification is 
deceptive as many apprentices may have wanted to hide a genteel status 
under the term “yeoman”. 
  
Table 4 Status and Occupations of the Apprentices’ Fathers 
 
 Bankers (n=174) 
Craftsmen 
(n=118) 
Esquire 27 (16%) 3 (3%) 
Gentleman 50 (29%) 21 (18%) 
   from London 8 (5%) 0 (0%) 
Esquire + Gentleman 77 (44%) 24 (20%) 
Yeoman 13 (7%) 13 (11%) 
Professional 15 (9%) 10 (8%) 
Mercantile, Trade or 
Craft 48 (28%) 43 (36%) 
    from London 32 (18%) 24 (20%) 
    Goldsmiths 7 (4%) 7 (6%) 
    Citizens of London 27 (16%) 15 (13%) 
Other 2 (1%) 5 (4%) 
Unknown 19 (11%) 23 (19%) 
Nonetheless, the first striking result is that only four to six percent 
of the apprentices’ fathers (respectively for the Bankers and the 
Craftsmen) were goldsmiths. This excludes however other forms of family 
relationships, for instance if brothers or uncles were in the Company as 
well (and it is therefore discussed in the next section) and masks the 
matrilineal line. 
Overall, the goldsmiths drew their recruits mainly from the gentry or 
groups with higher status (about a third overall) and nearly in the same 
proportion from the mercantile occupations, trades and crafts. It is 
relatively similar to the London Grocers or Apothecaries at the end of the 
century104. 
                                                 
103 Brooks, "Apprenticeship, Social Mobility and the Middling Sort, 1550-1800." p. 61. 
Brooks calls this phenomenon “status inflation” in the seventeenth century. 
104Ibid. p. 59. 
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Two categories are extremely under-represented: husbandmen and 
labourers. We found only one labourer, four graziers and two mariners in 
our sample. If social capital excluded certain socio-economic categories 
from being bound into the Goldsmiths’ Company, the poor, rural and low 
status groups seem to have been most affected. This conclusion is similar 
for most London Liveries. Brooks’ synthesis suggests that at most nine 
percent of the apprentices were sons of the husbandman. With regards to 
the socio-economic background of their recruits, the Newcastle Merchant 
Adventurers, the London Apothecaries and Barber-Surgeons are the 
most similar Companies to our sample of goldsmiths. 
Contrary to the analysis on geographical proximity, contrasts 
between the group of Bankers and Craftsmen are noticeable with respect 
to the occupation of the apprentices’ fathers. The Bankers drew forty four 
percent of their apprentices from the gentry and social groups with higher 
status and slightly less than a third (twenty eight percent) from sons of 
traders, retailers and other mercantile activities. The lucrative prospect of 
the trade and lack of handicraft work must have attracted the gentry. By 
comparing the trades of the apprentices’ fathers to D.V. Glass’ analysis of 
the 1692 Poll Tax105, we observe that about sixty percent had fathers who 
were in occupations supposed to be just as, or more, lucrative than the 
goldsmiths. The recruitment of the Bankers was therefore centred on the 
higher strata of society, both in terms of occupation, status and wealth. 
 Craftsmen on the contrary drew more sons of traders and 
craftsmen than sons of the gentry and other higher classes. Whereas 
Bankers attracted, or maybe also selected individuals with very 
comparable background as the other large mercantile trades, Craftsmen’s 
                                                 
 105 D.V. Glass, "Socio-Economic Status and Occupations in the City of London at the 
End of the Seventeenth Century," in Studies in London History, ed. A.E. J. Hollander 
and W. Kellaway (1969)., pp. 382-3 for a list of these categories. 
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recruitment is comparable to London crafts and smaller retailing trades106. 
On average they recruited apprentices whose fathers were as or less 
affluent than an average goldsmith, according to D.V Glass’ classification. 
Overall, the percentage of professionals’ sons is relatively high 
compared to the London average of two percent107. The main occupation 
of apprentices' fathers listed in the professional category was that of 
clerk. One could suspect that sons of clerks had higher literacy and 
numeracy skills that were extremely useful to become a goldsmith, 
especially to become a banker.  
 Given that we do not have access to fees premiums, it is very 
difficult to assess whether the fees were prohibitive to be bound to a 
Banker, whether apprentices were self-selected or if they followed 
network strategies. The restrictions to mobility detailed above cannot be 
interpreted in a straightforward manner. Banking was, nonetheless, likely 
to be a visible and known occupation to the higher circles of the gentry 
who shopped in the West End or to the City and Royal officials who dealt 
with loans and securities traded by the Bankers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
106 Brooks, "Apprenticeship, Social Mobility and the Middling Sort, 1550-1800." pp. 58-
59. 
107 Ibid. p. 59. 
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Table 5 Entry into the Livery and Occupation of the Apprentices’ Fathers 
 
Bankers 
(n=22) 
Craftsmen 
(n=12) 
Total 
(n=34) 
Esquire 3 (14%) 0 (0%) 3 (9%) 
Gentleman 5 (23%) 4 (33%) 9 (26%) 
   from London 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Esquire + Gentleman 8 (36%) 4 (33%) 12 (35%) 
Yeoman 2 (9%) 3 (25%) 5 (15%) 
Professional 3 (14%) 2 (17%) 5 (15%) 
Mercantile, Trade or Craft 9 (41%) 3 (25%) 12 (35%) 
    from London 5 (23%) 0 (0%) 5 (15%) 
    Goldsmiths 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
    Citizens of London 4 (18%) 0 (0%) 4 (12%) 
Other 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Unknown 1 (5%) 0 (0%) 1 (3%) 
 
Table 5 indicates that the socio-economic background of those 
entering the Livery is still relatively similar to that of the overall sample. 
About a third of the apprentices’ fathers were involved in mercantile 
activities and crafts, a fourth belonged to the gentry, a sixth to the 
yeomanry. In comparison, Table 6 shows an increasing dominance of the 
sons of craftsmen and traders. The reasons for this narrowing of the 
socio-economic background are hard to ascertain. The gentry may have 
wanted to distance itself from running a Company which was still 
dominantly populated by producers and retailers of plate, jewels. Another 
possibility is that sons of craftsmen and traders could be more familiar 
with the functioning of the guild and therefore managed more easily to 
enter higher offices. Social capital was possibly necessary to progress in 
a guild, it required alliances. Sons of craftsmen may have been most 
exposed to the inner working of the guilds. 
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Table 6 Wardens or Prime Wardens and their Fathers’ Occupation and 
Status 
 
Bankers 
(n=13) 
Craftsmen 
(n=2) 
Total 
(n=15) 
Esquire 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Gentleman 2 (15%) 0 (0%) 2 (13%) 
   from London 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Esquire + Gentleman 2 (15%) 0 (0%) 2 (13%) 
Yeoman 3 (23%) 0 (0%) 3 (20%) 
Professional 1 (8%) 0 (0%) 1 (7%) 
Mercantile, Trade or Craft 5 (38%) 2 (100%) 7 (47%) 
    From London 3 (23%) 0 (0%) 3 (20%) 
    Goldsmiths 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
    Citizens of London 2 (15%) 0 (0%) 2 (13%) 
Other 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Unknown 2 (15%) 0 (0%) 2 (13%) 
 
 The Company was therefore open to the sons of individuals in a 
large variety of trades but selectivity towards the gentry may have 
diminished the prospect of poorer groups such as the husbandmen. The 
former, through their social capital or their wealth maintained very high 
levels of entrance in the Bankers’ group. Whether it is a process of 
selection or self-selection is hard to tell but it implies that connections of 
the Bankers and that of the Craftsmen were relatively different. 
 
(iii)Kin 
The literature that stresses the existence of social capital in the 
guilds has tried to unearth family ties and kinship relationships. As 
Grassby108 noticed, business still rested on the household work which 
comprised family or kin members. Apprentices could eventually be 
integrated into the family, but how many were family-related?  
We have seen above that only a very small minority of the 
apprentices’ fathers were goldsmiths (five percent of our total sample). 
                                                 
108 Grassby, Kinship and Capitalism : Marriage, Family, and Business in the English 
Speaking World, 1580-1720. 
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Table 7 indicates that very few apprentices in our sample were also 
related to their masters directly as sons, brothers or cousins. 
 
Table 7 Kin Relationships in the Samples of Masters and Apprentices 
 Bankers Craftsmen
Number of apprentices 1 151 93 
Number of masters with at least one apprentice 27 20 
Number of masters with last name identical to 
apprentices 
10 
(37%) 5 (25%) 
Number of apprentices with last name identical to 
master 13 (9%) 5 (5%) 
Son 3 (2%) 1 (1%) 
Brother 6 (4%) 2 (2%) 
Other family tie 4 (3%) 1 (1%) 
 
1 The previous sample of apprentices was completed in this table with an additional 
search in the Records of Freedom and Apprenticeship at the Goldsmiths’ Company 
which found one more apprentice bound to his father. 
 
Thirteen apprentices of the Bankers, and five of the Craftsmen, 
share the same name as their masters. That represents only nine percent 
of the total sample of apprentices for Bankers and five percent for the 
Craftsmen. This percentage is an upper bound limit to the number of 
family members in the male lineage trained by our sample of goldsmiths 
(for example, sons, brothers, and cousins who shared last names). 
However, this table under-records other types of relationships, through 
the female lineage. Unexpected in these results is the number of brothers 
being trained, in close proportions to the number of sons, even if the 
overall figures remain low (about three percent). Limited endogamy has 
been explained by a diversification strategy. Farr has suggested that 
craftsmen did not display guild endogamy but artisanry endogamy109. 
This is verified partially in the case of the Goldsmiths’ Company but we 
can observe small group differences between the Bankers and the 
                                                 
109 Farr, Artisans in Europe, 1300-1914. p. 246. 
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Craftsmen with the former training slightly more family members 
personally. 
 Table 7, however, misses family members from the male lineage of 
Bankers and Craftsmen who were apprenticed to colleagues or sons who 
obtained Freedom through patrimony. An additional search, outside the 
previously described sample of apprentices was carried out in the 
Records of Freemen and Apprentices and Apprenticeship Records. 
Individuals who shared the same last name as the Bankers or Craftsmen, 
who were from the same county and whose fathers’ details could be 
traced are identified below as sons, daughters, brothers and wives of the 
Bankers and Craftsmen. The secondary literature and the wills from the 
Court of Canterbury were also used to document family links110. The table 
below therefore excludes links that were accounted for in Table 7. 
 
Table 8 Additional Kin Relationships Outside the Sample of Apprentices 
 
Bankers 
(n=32) 
Craftsmen 
(n=25) 
Master with another family tie in 
the company 10 (31%) 11 (34%) 
Son/daughter 11  (7 bankers) 12  (11 craftsmen) 
indentured to another master 6   (6 bankers) 5   (4 craftsmen) 
by patrimony 5   (4 bankers) 7   (7 craftsmen) 
brother 7   (4 bankers) 1   (1 craftsmen) 
wife 0 3   (3 craftsmen) 
 
The above information is an upper bound111 to the number of kin 
relationships outside our initial sample in the male lineage. It suggests 
that slightly over thirty percent of the Bankers had a member of their 
family involved with the Goldsmiths’ Company. This family member was 
                                                 
110 Samuel, "Sir Francis Child’s Jewellery Business.", Mitchell, "'Mr. Fowle Pray Pay the 
Washwoman': The Trade of a London Goldsmith-Banker, 1660-1692." 
111 It includes presumed family relationships: in the case of freedom by patrimony, 
records do not indicate the father’s name or occupation so such ties are mostly are a 
large estimate of real existing ties. 
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either being trained by a colleague, receiving Freedom through patrimony 
or, for wives, they were being involved in the workshop. Overall, when 
one combines the data of Table 7 and Table 8, that is kin members 
trained by the sampled goldsmiths and kin members not trained by the 
sampled goldsmiths, we observe that thirteen Craftsmen (fifty two percent 
of the sample) and seventeen Bankers (fifty three percent) have at least 
one kin member in the Goldsmiths’ Company. The average number of kin 
was 1.5 for the Craftsmen and 1.7 for the Bankers. 
Sons of Bankers were more likely to be trained by their fathers than 
sons of Craftsmen. Bankers trained many more of their brothers than the 
Craftsmen. The expected wealth to be gained from the trade could have 
stimulated such family strategies for the Bankers. The sample of 
Craftsmen on the other hand reveals that wives were involved in the 
training of brothers or sons if the master died prematurely. Given that 
Craftsmen households were poorer it is possible that women were more 
involved in the production process. It might also have been easier to 
teach crafts than banking activities. One daughter was also recorded as 
taking the Freedom of the Goldsmiths’ Company by patrimony.  
The tables above do not reveal whether having one to two family 
members in the trade was a very large number. To do so, it is necessary 
to estimate the share of children placed as apprentices or taking Freedom 
by patrimony from the Company112. The Wills of the Prerogative Court of 
Canterbury give us another indication of how many sons were oriented 
towards the trade of goldsmithing as a proportion of the children, what we 
call “trade continuity”. Nineteen wills (seven for the Bankers, twelve for 
the Craftsmen) were examined (Table 9 below). Although we cannot be 
                                                 
112 The Poll tax indicates an average of 1.9 children in Craftsmen’s households and 1.1 
in Bankers’ households but the age of masters and the number of years after marriage 
– data not available yet – could be explaining this difference. These values thus can 
not be considered as indicative of systematic demographic differences between 
Bankers and Craftsmen’s households.  
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certain that all children inherited, the literature suggests that equal share 
among the children was most common113 and we will therefore assume 
that all the children were mentioned in the wills.  
In this reduced sample of nineteen goldsmiths, Bankers have an 
average of 1.9 children per household and Craftsmen a 2.9 average. In 
both samples, half of the sons (about sixteen percent of the children) 
became Freemen from the Goldsmiths’ Company. It represents a low rate 
of trade continuation, especially when one considers that Freedom from 
the Company did not imply practising the trade of goldsmith.  
 
Table 9 Trade Continuity 
  Bankers Craftsmen 
Number of wills 7 12 
Number of children 1 13 (1.9 per master) 
35 
(2.9 per master)
Number of sons 2 4 (33%) 12 (39%) 
Known percentage of sons to 
become goldsmiths (including by 
patrimony) 
2 (50%) 6 (50%) 
Other member of family mentioned 
as being goldsmiths 4 5 
 
1 All children who are mentioned in the wills or recorded by the Court of Orphans. 
2 The percentage is calculated only on the number of children for which the sex was 
known. 
 
How do the Bankers differ from the Craftsmen at the Livery level? 
In the sample of twelve Craftsmen who were in the Livery, the sons of 
only four Craftsmen (thirty three percent of the masters) further continued 
as an apprentice in the Company or took Freedom from the Company by 
patrimony. In the sample of the Bankers, seven of the twenty two 
members (thirty two percent of the masters) of the Livery had sons 
                                                 
113 Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos, The Culture of Giving : Informal Support and Gift-
Exchange in Early Modern England, Cambridge Social and Cultural Histories 
(Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). p. 19. 
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involved in the company, as apprentices or as Freemen by patrimony. 
There is thus no advantage for the sons of Bankers involved in the Livery 
over the sons of Craftsmen. This suggests that, for goldsmiths who 
reached higher levels of the Company, the decision of sons to enter into 
the Company was similar for both groups. Nonetheless, Bankers in the 
Livery had more kin members in the family because of the greater 
number of brothers who were being trained in this group. 
 
(iv) Integrative Capacity of the Goldsmiths’ Company 
 To enquire into the guilds’ capacity to create shared values and a 
sense of brotherhood among their members, the wills proved at the 
Prerogative Court of Canterbury were used.  
The analysis of nineteen wills (Table 10) reveals weak links of 
masters with the Goldsmiths’ Company and a low willingness to bequest 
to its members and the poor of the Company. Overall, only one goldsmith 
gave to the poor of the Goldsmith’s Company. Four other masters 
donated to the poor of their county of origin or parish of residence. These 
figures (twenty six percent of the masters donated to the poor) are close 
to Earle’s estimates who calculated an average of thirty percent114. 
Bankers in our sample donated more to the poor, probably because of 
their wealth and other sample biases (two Bankers were childless) but 
overall only one goldsmiths donated to the poor of the Company. Four 
goldsmiths made bequests to non-family related colleagues (twenty nine 
percent of Bankers and seventeen percent of Craftsmen). The figures rise 
to fifty seven percent for the Bankers when bequests were made to 
goldsmiths who were also family members and remains at seventeen 
percent for the Craftsmen. These numbers seem to indicate that the 
likelihood to donate to fellow goldsmiths was increased by existing family 
                                                 
114 Earle, The Making of the English Middle Class : Business, Society and Family Life in 
London, 1660-1730. pp. 316-9. 
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ties. Donations to the family seem the most important and common 
pattern to both groups: most of the wills name the wife and the children as 
the main benefactors. It suggests therefore that social capital in the guilds 
and social capital in the kin could be in competition. Even if Bankers were 
more likely to give to goldsmiths who were not family-related than the 
Craftsmen, the vast majority of the bequests was to their respective 
families and friends. 
 
Table 10 Bequests and Wealth Management  
 Bankers Craftsmen 
Number of wills 7 12 
Number of goldsmiths who made :   
- bequests  to the Company, its poor, or officials 1 (14%) 0 (0%) 
- bequests  to poor from parish or county of origin 3 (43%) 1 (8%) 
-  bequests to goldsmiths who are not family 
members 2 (29%) 2 (17%) 
- bequests to goldsmiths who are family members 4 (57%) 2 (17%) 
 
Executors : The number of wills appointing:   
Family members only 5 (71%) 9 (75%) 
Goldsmiths family-related and family members 2 (29%) 1 (8%) 
Not family-related goldsmiths only 0 (0%) 1 (8%) 
 
Executing a will was a crucial task after the decease of a goldsmith. 
This task was sometimes shared between several individuals, as noticed 
in the literature. In our sample, only two goldsmiths appointed unrelated 
goldsmiths as executors. Most executors were family-related to the 
testator and not members of the Goldsmiths’ Company (seventy one to 
seventy five percent of the Wills). In three cases only was this task shared 
with family members who were also goldsmiths. Most often the wife was 
to carry out this task alone or shared the burden with the testator’s 
brother and sons-in-law. 
 It therefore appears that the guilds had little grip on family 
donations and even less on its wealth management after the goldsmith’s 
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death. Bequests were probably dependent on individuals’ wealth, their 
friendships with other goldsmiths but it was not the norm in the Company. 
The evidence on a closely-knit network of individuals with powerful social 
capital is therefore mixed for the overall sample. 
 
 
Summary 
 Various types of social capital could be at work to enter or progress 
into the London Goldsmiths’ Company. Geographical origin seems to 
have mattered for neither of them. Occupational proximity on the other 
hand reveals curious patterns. Although the gentry and groups with 
higher status dominate at the recruitment of apprentices, there is a 
reverse trend in the composition of the higher bodies of governance in the 
Company. With the current data, only hypotheses can be provided to 
explain such a pattern. Kinship relationships are very modest in our 
sample and slightly higher for the Bankers. Both groups of Craftsmen and 
Bankers nevertheless displayed only low guild identity. Donations to the 
charities of the Company or to friends who were members of the 
Company were modest for both Bankers and Craftsmen. 
 The group of Bankers as a professional group is atypical in the 
guild of the Goldsmiths’. It displays extremely high internal mobility. 
Quinn115  has suggested that filtering procedures among the goldsmiths 
were necessary to their trade. It is also noteworthy that they may have 
had higher connections and social capital outside their trades through 
their loans or jewellery sales to the gentry. Bankers participated more to 
                                                 
115 Stephen Quinn, "Balances and Goldsmith-Bankers: The Co-Ordination and Control 
of Inter-Banker Debt Clearing in Seventeenth-Century London," in Goldsmiths, 
Silversmiths and Bankers: Innovation and the Transfer of Skill, 1550 to 1750, ed. David 
Mitchell (Stroud, 1995). p. 414. 
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the civic life as Alderman, which could bring them “dignity”116  but also 
other advantages such as cheap borrowing from the Chamber, the 
Orphans’ Fund, beneficial leases as well as insider’s information117.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 The guilds in the seventeenth century have often been pictured as 
persisting through strong social ties because of the exclusionary 
regulations on apprenticeship, mastership and quality regulations. They 
have also been perceived as displaying strong oligarchic tendencies, 
especially with the closing of the century. Kinship has been deemed to 
cement the bonds of this closed community. The most recent literature 
has, however, emphasized mobility and openness in English society and 
the deep migratory movements associated with the apprenticeship 
system. Nevertheless, only a few studies have yet contributed to 
determine how and when internal mobility in the guilds occurred and on 
what kinds of networks social capital rested in the guilds.  
 By asking who could become a goldsmith in the second half of the 
seventeenth century in London, this study addresses both the issues of 
the openness of an English guild and internal mobility. This study 
suggests that the role of social capital in the so-called pre-industrial world 
must be nuanced.  
 The use of social capital to enter the guild of the Goldsmiths’ was 
analyzed through the lens of mobility and social ties, following scholars 
such as Bourdieu and Loury. High levels of geographical mobility in our 
study suggest that social capital acquired through geographical proximity 
was not decisive for an apprentice to enter a guild.  Occupational 
                                                 
116 Earle, The Making of the English Middle Class: Business, Society and Family Life in 
London, 1660-1730. p. 248. 
117 Grassby, The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England. p. 229. 
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selectivity is more noticeable in the nearly complete absence of sons of 
husbandmen. The gentry and artisanry were both overrepresented. 
Women are only indirectly detected as participating to the workshop and 
training activity. 
 Within the Goldsmiths’ Company, geographical origin or a high 
socio-economic status did not play a role in the rise to power at the top of 
the guild. The gentry or groups with higher status are not dominant any 
more at the level of Wardenship, on the contrary, sons of craftsmen and 
traders are the most represented. Explanations for such a reversal 
require further research to analyze the opportunities that opened to the 
different groups, when they were taken and to what extent they were the 
result of social capital. 
 The role of the kin relationship is also put into question. Very few 
goldsmiths had a father in that trade and if so, they were also trained by 
fellow masters, possibly to secure the acquisition of different skills. 
Conversely we observe that only modest numbers of masters’ children 
became involved in the Goldsmiths’ Company a generation later after our 
sample. In that respect, members of the Livery did not fare better in 
placing sons into apprenticeship within the Company. 
 The integrative capacity of the company is jeopardized when 
analyzing transfers of wealth and charity in the goldsmiths’ wills. A small 
number of Bankers gave to the fraternity and the poor of the Goldsmiths’ 
Company. Bequests to family members and friends who were from the 
Goldsmiths’ Company were more common in both groups. 
 Nonetheless, the Goldsmiths’ Company cannot be considered as 
one homogeneous group. It was divided across wealth and social status 
lines. The group of Bankers that emerged in the second half of the 
seventeenth century entertained strong ties with each other, probably in 
part because of the risks and necessities of their occupation. However, 
they did not gain powerful positions within the guild mainly through the 
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social capital that they inherited from their families. They were hardly any 
more likely to have been from London than the Craftsmen and retailers in 
the sample.  Furthermore those who eventually reached power in the 
Company were not overrepresented in the gentry or categories with 
higher social status. The social capital created during the period of the 
apprenticeship and then in the Livery must have been crucial. Differences 
of internal mobility are relative at the Livery level but dramatic at the 
Wardenship level. Wealth is another potential candidate to explain such 
differences of internal mobility and could have complemented social 
capital. They had a small advantage in terms of family relationships over 
other groups of goldsmiths at the Company even if their trade continuity 
over several generations was also quite low and similar to the Craftsmen. 
 At this stage, the research only hints at how or why Bankers 
acquired, used or developed social capital. Banking practices were still 
extremely risky as the several crises that punctuated the century show. 
Information on the financial situations of colleagues or customers was 
scarce. Establishing strong ties with apprentices who would be future 
colleagues or partners was advantageous for monitoring them. As for any 
specialization, apprenticeship introduced the novice to skills, techniques 
and lucrative practices, as well as to customers. It provided insider’s 
information. The networks of the Bankers may also have been more 
diverse than those of the Craftsmen. The customers of the goldsmiths 
were likely to have been relatively well off to buy plate and jewellery. The 
Bankers were however more likely to provide financial services for 
merchants, traders and royal authorities, additional networks through 
which they could draw social capital. They participated more often to local 
politics which was time consuming but could bring its benefits.  
 All in all, this case study has confirmed the general pattern of socio-
economic mobility in the guilds and their openness to immigrants within 
England. With specialization and hierarchical stratification, interests of 
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guildsmen’s groups were likely to coalesce and social capital to develop. 
In this regard, apprenticeship seems to be an important phase of social 
capital formation for guildsmen to further evolve within the guild.  
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Appendix 
List of the Names of the Goldsmiths in the Two Samples: 
Craftsmen 
  
Court of Orphans 
reference number 
“s”: shop  
“w” 
workhouse 
“b”: shop 
and 
workhouse 
“u” : 
unknown Will Reference 
Identified 
in the Poll 
Tax 1692 
John Austen CLA/002/02/01/0711 B     
Thomas Ash CLA/002/02/01/2999 S   Yes  
Lancellot Baker CLA/002/02/01/2411 S   Yes  
Christopher Canner CLA/002/02/01/2782 S Prob 11/499 Yes  
Oliver Chadwell CLA/002/02/01/0844 S     
William Coleman CLA/002/02/01/1994 S     
Leonard Collard CLA/002/02/01/1138 S Prob 11/337   
Samuel Day CLA/002/02/01/2708 W Prob 11/486 Yes  
Robert Fincham CLA/002/02/01/1079 B     
Thomas Folkingham CLA/002/02/01/3330/A S Prob 11/633   
William Grant CLA/002/02/01/1200 B     
Francis Grevill CLA/002/02/01/2587 S Prob 11/471 Yes  
Robert Hill CLA/002/02/01/2233 S Prob 11/429 Yes  
Edward Horne CLA/002/02/01/2004 S Prob 11/381   
Thomas  Issod CLA/002/02/01/2296 S   Yes  
Simon  Knight CLA/002/02/01/2830 S Prob 11/503   
John Latham CLA/002/02/01/1398 S Prob 11/357   
Thomas Loveday CLA/002/02/01/2042 B CLA/002/03/005 Yes  
Daniel Madox CLA/002/02/01/0690 S Prob 11/333   
John Marlow CLA/002/02/01/0812 S   Yes  
Arthur Morgan CLA/002/02/01/0962 S     
Thomas Prince CLA/002/02/01/0491 S     
John Rusden CLA/002/02/01/2903 S Prob 11/517   
Thomas Sadler CLA/002/02/01/3156 S     
Philip Treherne CLA/002/02/01/1526 S     
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Bankers   
Court of Orphans 
reference number 
 “s”: shop  
“w” 
workhouse 
“b”: shop and 
workhouse 
“u” : unknown Will Reference 
Identified in 
the 1692 
Poll Tax 
John Addis     Prob 11/461   
John Ballard        
Robert Blanchard    Prob 11/366   
John Bolitho        
Abraham Chambers CLA/002/02/01/2198/A S Prob 11/414   
Francis Child      Yes 
John Coggs        
Thomas Cooke        
Charles Duncombe      Yes 
Stephen Evance      Yes 
Charles Everard CLA/002/02/01/0333 S     
Thomas Fowles        
Benjamin Hinton        
Joseph Hornby      Yes 
Francis Kenton        
Thomas Kirwood        
Henry Lamb        
James Lapley        
John Mawson    Prob 11/528   
Francis  Meynell CLA/002/02/01/0405 U     
Henry Nelthrope        
Benjamin Norrington        
Thomas Pardo        
Peter Percival    Prob 11/417 Yes 
Thomas Rowe        
Michael Scrimpshire        
Humphrey  Stockes    Prob 11/410 Yes 
John Sweetaple      Yes 
John Thursby    Prob 11/460 Yes 
John Townley        
Bernard Turner        
Robert Ward         
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